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CYBER attacks have risen in recent times. The attackon Sony Pictures by hackers, allegedly from North
Korea, has caught worldwide attention. The President of the
United States of America issued a statement and “vowed a
US response after North Korea’s alleged cyber-attack”.This
dangerous malware termed “wiper” could overwrite data and
stop important execution processes. An analysis by the FBI
showed distinct similarities between this attack and the code
used to attack South Korea in 2013, thus confirming that
hackers re-use code from already existing malware to create
new variants. This attack along with other recently discovered
attacks such as Regin, Opcleaver give one clear message:
current cyber security defense mechanisms are not sufficient
enough to thwart these sophisticated attacks.
Today’s defense mechanisms are based on scanning systems
for suspicious or malicious activity. If such an activity is found,
the files under suspect are either quarantined or the vulnerable
system is patched with an update. These scanning methods
are based on a variety of techniques such as static analysis,
dynamic analysis and other heuristics based techniques, which
are often slow to react to new attacks and threats. Static
analysis is based on analyzing an executable without executing
it, while dynamic analysis executes the binary and studies
its behavioral characteristics. Hackers are familiar with these
standard methods and come up with ways to evade the current
defense mechanisms. They produce new malware variants that
easily evade the detection methods. These variants are created
from existing malware using inexpensive easily available “fac-
tory toolkits” in a “virtual factory” like setting, which then
spread over and infect more systems. Once a system is com-
promised, it either quickly looses control and/or the infection
spreads to other networked systems. While security techniques
constantly evolve to keep up with new attacks, hackers too
change their ways and continue to evade defense mechanisms.
As this never-ending billion dollar “cat and mouse game”
continues, it may be useful to look at avenues that can bring
in novel alternative and/or orthogonal defense approaches to
counter the ongoing threats. The hope is to catch these new
attacks using orthogonal and complementary methods which
may not be well known to hackers, thus making it more
difficult and/or expensive for them to evade all detection
schemes. This paper focuses on such orthogonal approaches
from Signal and Image Processing that complement standard
approaches.
MALWARE LANDSCAPE
Malware - malicious software, is any software that is
designed to cause damage to a computer, server, network,
mobile phones and more such devices. Based on their func-
tion, malware are classified into different Types such as Tro-
jans, Backdoors, Virus, Worm, Spyware, Adware and more.
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Fig. 1: Malware Landscape
Malware are also identified by which Platform they belong
to, such as Windows, Linux, AndroidOS and others. Apart
from Types and Platforms, malware are further classified into
Families depending on their specific function. These Families
in turn have many Variants which perform almost the same
function. The entire malware landscape is shown in Fig. 1.
According to the Computer Antivirus Research Organiza-
tion (CARO) convention for naming malware, a malware is
represented by: Type:Platform/Family.Variant. For example,
PWS:Win32/Zbot.gen!AF denotes a password stealer malware
of the generic Zbot family that attacks 32-bit Windows plat-
forms.
Malware variants are created either by making changes
to the malware code or by using executable packers. In the
former case a simple mutation occurs by changing small
parts of the code. These are referred as unpacked malware
variants. In the latter case a more complex mutation occurs
either by compressing or encrypting (usually with different
keys) the main body of the code and appending a decom-
pression/decryption routine, which during runtime decom-
presses/decrypts the encrypted payload. The new variants are
called packed malware variants and they perform the same
function as the original malware but their attributes would
be so different that Antivirus software, which use traditional
signature based detection, would not be able to detect them.
The tools used for obfuscation are called Executable Packers,
available both as freeware and commercial tools. There are
hundreds of packers that exist today which make it very easy
for malware writers to create new variants.
MALWARE ANALYSIS
Malware classification deals with identifying the family of
an unknown malware variant from a malware dataset that is
divided into many families. The level of risk of a particular
malware is determined by what function it does, which is in
turn reflected in its family. Hence, identifying the malware
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Fig. 2: Malware represented as a Signal and an Image
family of an unknown malware is crucial in understanding
and stopping new malware. It is usually assumed that an
unknown malware variant belongs to a known set of malware
families (supervised classification). Having a high classifica-
tion accuracy (the number of correctly classified families)
is desirable. A closely related problem is malware retrieval
where the objective is to retrieve similar malware matches
for a given query from a large database of malware. In
malware detection the problem is to determine if an unknown
executable is malicious, benign or unknown. This problem
is more challenging than malware classification where all
samples are known to be malicious. In this tutorial we will
focus on malware classification and malware retrieval.
While most malware are geared towards Windows Operat-
ing System, they are also quickly expanding to other avenues
such as Android, Linux and OS X. Antivirus vendor G-DATA
reported that they discovered more than 1.5 Million malicious
Android apps in 2014 and more than 400,000 apps in just the
first quarter of 2015. Similarly, there has also been a stark rise
in Linux malware and OS X malware. An important question
in this context is: Can we have a single method that can detect
malware irrespective of which Operating System it comes from
without having to know the nuances of each system?
A common way to defeat static analysis is by using packers
on a executable which compress and/or encrypt the executable
code and create a new packed executable that mimics the
previous executable in function but reveals the actual code
only upon execution runtime. Dynamic analysis is agnostic
to packing but is slow and time consuming. Further, today’s
malware are designed to be Virtual Machine (VM) aware,
which either do not do any malicious activity in the presence
of VM or attempts a “suicide” when a VM is detected. The
challenges here are: Can we design techniques that are fast,
do not need disassembly, unpacking or execution?
A key emphasis in all the above-mentioned challenges
is development of complementary methods that address the
limitations of existing approaches. Alternative representations
of malware data such as signals or images have patterns that
are not captured by standard methods. We explore these types
of representations in this paper.
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Fig. 3: Example of a Malware Image
MALWARE IMAGES
A common method of viewing and editing malware binaries
is by using Hex Editors, which display the bytes of the binaries
in hexadecimal representation from ‘00’ to ‘FF’. Effectively,
these are 8-bit numbers in the range of 0-255. Grouping
these 8-bit numbers results in a 8-bit vector, from which
we construct a signal or an image as shown in Fig. 2. For
an image, the width is fixed and the height is allowed to
vary depending on the file size. Fig. 3 shows an example
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Fig. 4: Visual similarity among malware variants of 4 different families
image of a common Windows Trojan downloader, Dontovo.A,
which downloads and executes arbitrary files. We can see that
different sections of this malware exhibit distinctive image
patterns. The .text section which contains the executable code
has a fine grained texture. It is followed by a black block
(zeros), indicating zero padding at the end of this section. The
.data section contains both uninitialized code (black patch) and
initialized data (fine grained texture). The final .rsrc section
contains all the resources of the module, including the icon of
the executable.
Dataset Size No. of Families Accuracy
Malimg (Win) 9,339 25 97.4
Malheur (Win) 3,131 24 98.37
VxShare (Linux) 568 8 83.27
Malgenome (Android) 1,200 13 97.4
Fig. 5: Classification Accuracy on Datasets from different
Operating Systems
When we visualized a large number of malware variants,
an empirical observation we could make is that there was
visual similarity among malware variants of the same family
(Fig. 4). At the same time, the variants were also distinct from
those belonging to other families. This is because the variants
are created using either simple code mutations or packing. It
is easy to identify the variants for unpacked malware since
the structure of the variants are very similar. In the case of
packed malware, the executable code is compressed and/or
encrypted. During runtime, this code is then unpacked and
executed. When two unpacked variants belonging to a specific
malware family are using a packer to obtain packed variants
of the same family, their structure no longer remains the
same as that of the unpacked variants. However, the structure
within the packed variants are still similar though the actual
bytes may vary due to compression and/or encryption. The
visual similarity of malware images motivated us to look at
malware classification using techniques from computer vision,
where image based classification has been well studied. We
use global image similarity descriptors and obtain compact
signatures for these malware, which are then used to identify
their families.
CLASSIFICATION
Once the malware binary is converted to an image, an
image similarity descriptor is computed on the image to
characterize the malware. The descriptor that we use is
the GIST feature [1], which is commonly used in image
recognition systems such as scene classification [1], object
recognition [2] and large scale image search [3]. Every image
location is represented by the output of filters tuned to different
orientations and scales. A steerable pyramid with 4 scales and
8 orientations is used. The local representation of an image is
then given by: V L(x) = Vk(x)k=1..N where N = 20 is the
number of sub-bands. To capture the global image properties
while retaining some local information, the mean value of the
magnitude of the local features is computed and averaged over
large spatial regions: m(x) =
∑
x′ |V (x′)|W (x′ − x) where
W (x) is the averaging window. The resulting representation
is downsampled to have a spatial resolution of M×M pixels
(here we use M=4). Thus the feature vector obtained is of size
M×M×N = 320. For faster processing, the images are usually
resized to a smaller size (we use 64× 64).
To identify malware families, we perform supervised classi-
fication with 10-fold cross validation and compute the average
classification accuracy. We use Nearest Neighbor (NN) clas-
sifier which assigns the family of the nearest malware to an
unknown malware. We obtained four datasets: Malimg dataset
(Windows) [6], Malheur dataset (Windows) [7], MalGenome
dataset (Android) [5] and VxShare ELF dataset (Linux) [8].
On all four datasets, we obtained a high classification accuracy
(Fig. 5). Further, on comparing our approach with dynmaic
analysis, our method was comparable in terms of classification
accuracy but 4,000 times faster than dynamic analysis [9].
In [10], we extend our approach to separate malware from
benign software. In order to get a richer discrimination be-
tween benign and malicious samples, we adopt a section-
aware approach and compute GIST descriptors on the entire
binary as well as the top two sections of the binary which
could contain the code. With more than 99% precision, our
approach outperformed other static similarity features.
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SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL
We developed SARVAM: Search And RetrieVAl of Mal-
ware [11] (accessible at http://sarvam.ece.ucsb.edu), an online
system for large scale malware search and retrieval. It is
one of the few systems available to public where researchers
can upload or search for a sample and retrieve similar mal-
ware matches from a large database. Leveraging on our past
work [4], we use GIST descriptors for content-based search
and retrieval of malware. These effectively capture the visual
(structural) similarity between similar malware variants. For
fast search and retrieval, we use a scalable Balltree-based
Nearest Neighbor searching technique. On a database of more
than 7 Million samples comprising mostly malware and a
few benign samples, SARVAM could find a match in about 6
seconds. SARVAM has been operational since May 2012 and
during this period, we received more than 440,000 samples.
Nearly 60% were possible variants of already existing malware
from our database.
There are two phases in the system design as illustrated
in Fig. 6. During the initial phase, we first obtain a large
corpus of malware samples from various sources . The image
fingerprints for all the samples in the corpus are then computed
and stored in a database. Simultaneously, we obtain the
Antivirus (AV) labels for all the samples from Virustotal [12],
an online system that maintains a database of AV labels. These
labels act as a ground truth and are later used to describe the
nature of a sample, i.e., how malicious or benign a sample
is. During the query phase, the fingerprint for the new sample
is computed and matched with the existing fingerprints in the
database to retrieve the top matches.
Of the 440,000 uploaded samples we received, not all the
samples have a good match with our corpus database. In Fig. 7,
we see the distribution of the confidence levels of the top
match. Close to 37% fall under Very High Confidence, 8%
under High Confidence, 49.5% under Low confidence and
5.5% under Very Low Confidence.
Fig. 7: Confidence of the Top Match
SPARSITY BASED MALWARE ANALYSIS
In this part we explore Sparse Representation based Classi-
fication (SRC) methods to classify malware variants into fam-
ilies. Such methods have been previously applied to problems
where samples belonging to a class have small variations in
them, such as face recognition [14] and iris recognition [16].
We developed SATTVA: SparsiTy inspired classificaTion of
malware VAriants [13], where we model a malware variant be-
longing to a particular malware family as a linear combination
of variants from that family. Since variants of a family have
small changes in the overall structure and differ from variants
of other families, projections of malware in lower dimensions
preserve this “similarity”.
Given a dataset of N labeled malware belonging to L
different malware families with P malware per family, the
task is to identify the family of an unknown malware u. We
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Fig. 8: Sparse Representation based Classification (SRC) framework for Malware Classification
represent a malware as a digital signal x of range [0, 255],
where every entry of x is a byte value of the malware. Since
each malware sample can have a different code-length, we
normalize all vectors to a maximum length (M ) by zero-
padding.
The entire dataset can now be represented as an M × N
matrix A, where every column represents a malware. Further,
for every family k (k = 1, 2, ..., L), we define an M×P matrix
Ak = [xk1,xk2, ...xkP ] where xk{.} represents a malware
sample belonging to family k. Now, A can be expressed as a
concatenation of block-matrices Ak:
A = [A1A2..AL] ∈ RM×N (1)
Let u ∈ RM be an unknown malware whose family is to
be determined, with the assumption that u belongs to one of
the families in the dataset. Then, following [14], we represent
u as a sparse linear combination of the training samples as:
u =
L∑
i=1
P∑
j=1
αijxij = Aα (2)
where α = [α1,1, ..., αL,P ]T represents the N × 1 sparse
coefficient vector (N = LP ). α will have non-zero values only
for samples that are from the same family as u. The sparsest
solution to (2) can be obtained using Basis Pursuit [16] by
solving the following l1-norm minimization problem:
αˆ = argmin
α′∈RN
‖α′‖1 subject to u = Aα′ (3)
Estimating the family of u is done by computing residuals
for every family in the training set and then selecting the
family that has minimum residue.
RANDOM PROJECTIONS
When a malware binary is represented as a numerical vector
by considering every byte, the dimensions of that vector can be
very high. For example, a 1 MB malware has around 1 Million
bytes and this could make the calculations computationally
expensive. Hence, we project the vectors to lower dimensions
using Random Projections (RP). This also removes depen-
dency on any particular feature extraction method. Previous
works have demonstrated that SRC is effective in lower-
dimensional random projections as well, see [14]–[16]. Let
R ∈ RD×M be the matrix that projects u from signal space
M to w of lower dimensional space D (D << M ):
w = Ru = RAα (4)
The entries of R are drawn from a zero mean normal dis-
tribution. The above system of equations is underdetermined
and sparse solutions can be obtained by reduced l1-norm
minimization:
αˆ = argmin
α′∈RN
‖α′‖1 subject to w = RAα′ (5)
The overall approach is shown in Fig.8.
We tested our technique on two public malware datasets:
Malimg Dataset [6] and Malheur Dataset [7]. On both datasets,
we selected equal number of samples to reduce any bias
towards a particular family.For comparison, we used GIST
descriptors, which we had previously applied for malware clas-
sification. We used the SRC framework to identify the malware
family of a test sample and compared with Nearest Neighbors
(NN) classification that was previously used in [4]. We varied
the dimensions from {48, 96, 192, 256, 384, 512}, which are
consistent for both RP and GIST. In our experiments, we chose
80% of a dataset for training and 20% for testing. On both the
Malimg dataset (Fig. 9a) and the Malheur dataset (Fig. 9b),
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Fig. 9: Experimental Results on (a) Malimg Dataset and (b) Malheur Dataset with features using Random Projections (RP)
and GIST, and classification algorithms using Sparse Representation based Classification (SRC) and Nearest Neighbor (NN).
the best accuracy is obtained for the combination of Random
Projections (RP) and the SRC classification framework. The
accuracies for GIST for both classifiers were almost the same.
In [13], we further showed how this approach can be used to
reject potential outliers in a dataset and also evaluated on large
scale datasets having 42,480 malware and 2,124 families.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
While we explored signal and image based analysis of
malware data, a natural complement is to treat the malware
as audio-like one dimensional signals and leverage automated
audio descriptors. Another possible approach is computing
image similarity descriptors and/or random projections on all
the sections and represent a malware as bag of descriptors,
which can then be used for better characterization of malware.
Using the error model in the sparse representation based
malware classification framework, we can determine the exact
positions in which the malware variant differs from another
variant. This approach can also be used to find the exact source
from which a malware variant evolves. Patched malware that
attaches to benign software can be identified using this method.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we explored orthogonal yet complementary
methods to analyze malware motivated by Signal and Image
Processing. Malware samples are represented as images or
signals. Image and signal based features are extracted to
characterize malware. Our extensive experiments demonstrate
the efficacy of our methods on malware classification and
retrieval. We believe that our techniques will open the scope of
signal and image based methods to broader fields in computer
security.
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